December 25th, 1944(MONDAY)
BELGIUM: The U.S. 2nd Armored Division counterattacks the 2nd Panzer Division at Celles, in one of the crucial moments in the Ardennes battle. (Keith Allen)
General der Infanterie Heinz Kokott, Commanding General 26 Volks Grenadier Division:
"At the designated time - as far as I can recollect, towards 0500 hours - in the moonlit early morning hour, the attack- and assault troops began the attack on the entire circle surrounding Bastogne (with the exception of the northern sector).
"Already before that, the assault troops had sneaked up as closely as possible to the enemy and had even penetrated his front between some individual enemy pockets. Preparatory fire by the artillery had been abstained from purposefully. A very strong and concentrated fire barrage of all calibres hit the enemy like a blow at the moment of the attack, destroyed his known pockets of resistance and sealed off in depth. With tremendous force the Grenadiers and Panzer Grenadiers drove towards the enemy and fought their way forward from pocket to pocket. After having recovered from the initial shock, the enemy forces got hold of themselves and along the entire front there began a wild, furious struggle.
"Grenadier Regiment 77 had entered the village of Champs towards 0600 hours, elements fought their way forward between Champs and Longchanps.
"The Longchamps - Champs road was being crossed. A furious battle developed inside Champs. Several enemy counterthrusts - supported by powerful- artillery- mortar- and tank fire - forced the elements of Grenadier Regiment 77 out of Champs. To the northwest thereof, the German elements were holding out and repelled the enemy thrusts.
'Grenadier Regiment 77 started out for another attack on Champs. Tremendous enemy fire was directed into the area around Champs. Powerful German fire prepared for the new thrust by Regiment 77.
"While attack and counterattack were alternating in the Champs area, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division - supported by devastating German fire - had penetrated deeply into the enemy formations east of 'Fond de Laval' and. Between 0800 and 0900 hours, had split open the enemy front there.
"At about that time, the armored groups of the Panzer Grenadier Division - supported by rolling fire of the concentrated artillery - drove through the opening.
"Reconnaissance Battalion 26, adjoining to the right, was pushing forward on both sides of the highway to the west in fierce battle.
"The enemy put up a desperate defence, carried out counterthrust upon counterthrust, again and again brought tanks and destroyers into the battle and consumed quantities of ammunition as had previously not been experienced there,
"Nevertheless the German units, supported by the very strongest own fire, were advancing and made their way deeper and deeper into the enemy defence belt.
"After 0900 hours enemy fighter-bombers were fully in command of the air and participated in the furious ground fighting with bombs and aircraft armament.
"Grenadier Regiment 77 had broken into Champs for a second time and some of its elements were pushing to the south thereof.
"Rifle Regiment 39, fighting against fanatical enemy resistance, advanced on both sides of the Neufchateau railroad line and road, as they had been ordered.
"Panzer Grenadier Regiment 901 with assault detachments drove from the southeast towards the Bastogne - Bras road. There- just as at Grenadier Regiment 78 - enemy resistance and the enemy fire were very strong. With an eye on their objectives, however, the assault forces there drove forward and gained ground.
"At around 1000 hours the battle seemed to reach its peak and success seemed very close.
"Grenadier Regiment 77 reported: 'Heavy fighting around Champs, to the south, penetration into the wooded sections west of Rolle. Fierce enemy counteraction.'
"15th Panzer Grenadier Division: 'Armored attack gains ground against strong enemy defence, come up close to Champs - Hemroulle road. Hemroulle and wooded sections to the north thereof held by the enemy. High losses on own side.'
"Reconnaissance Battalion 26: 'Enemy counterthrusts repelled. Reconnaissance Battalion 26 continues atack in direction of Isle-laHesse.'
"Rifle Regiment 39: 'Despite strong enemy defence and heavy losses, attack in direction of Isle-le-Bre - Halte makes slow progress.'
"Panzer Grenadier Regiment 901: 'Own assault troops approaching - advancing west of Marvie - Bastogne road. Strong enemy defence, heavy losses on our own side, final reserves committed.'
Grenadier Regiment 78: "Own assault troops - advancing on both sides of Bastogne - Bourcy railroad line - approaching forest exit (1400 meters) northeast of Lucery [Luzery]. Strong enemy fire.
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A personal note: The railroad was the boundary of the 501st Parachute Infantry to the east and the 506th Parachute Infantry to the west. In a house just off the railroad the boundary was secured by a rifle squad from each regiment. Apparently the German attack impressed the local commanders of the 506th. At the time of the attack our FO team was with one of the other 506th units but we were sent to the house. Perhaps the Germans knew that this was the boundary and felt that it would be a weak point. Wrong. Those two regiments were tied in tight. When we got there a few dead Germans were lying on the ground just a few meters from the house. They must have pushed that attack. I don't think that we would have been sent there if this had not been the boundary because the observation was limited due to the forest. However, we fired several concentrations on approaches to the position and would have made it difficult for an enemy to approach the area.
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"The battle continued to boil without pause. One had the impression that enemy resistance would have to break down now. The regiments had thrown their reserves into the fighting, their staffs had been stripped clerks, messengers and other personnel had been assigned to the firing line. The 14th company (tank destroyer) of each regiment had for a long time been fighting as rifle companies in the forward lines; the heavy infantry weapons were manned only by a few, vitally necessary crews, everyone else was fighting in the forward most line."
"Now that everything was at stake, the 26th Division moved up its reserves in order to exploit the growing success of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and to feed the attack."
"Reconnaissance Battalion 26 around this time was engaged in bitter - tough apparently successful - fighting in front of Isle-la-Hesse. Grenadier Regiment 77 reported that the battle inside Champs was hopeless in view of the losses and the fact that it was impossible to bring in reserves. The regiment asked permission to give up Champs to be in a position of making an all-out effort - while holding on to the heights immediately northeast of Champs - to carry the attack forward under more favorable conditions. South of Champs (via Grandes Fanges).
"The division approved this request: the objective was not Champs, but Bastogne.
"Towards noon - when everything had been committed and the artillery, while already running short of ammunition, was still directing its fire concentration with flexibility and full impact into the respective main areas (forest northeast of Grandes Fanges, Hemroulle and wooded sections to the north thereof) - the situation turned more and more to the worse.
"The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division reported "that it had barely a single combat-fit tank at its disposal. The committed tank battalion had been wiped out and annihilated in the area around Hemroulle and nothing was being heard of the 'Kommandegruppe' (commander group) which had possibly made a breakthrough in the Bastogne direction..
"Grenadier Regiment 77 was engaged in furious, fluctuating battles in the area between Hemroulle and Champs. The losses were almost no longer bearable. In order to exploit the initial success, all the forces, including the division reserve had been committed there. At the time, the regiment, despite extremely heavy losses, put up a stubborn battle between Hemroulle and Grandes Fanges. The battered units were exposed to the most powerful enemy fire coming from the forest north of Hemroulle.
"Disregarding all losses, the Grenadiers - driven forward either by their own impulse or led by their officers and older comrades - had tried again and again to climb up the slope to Hemroulle. Every time, however, the assault groups had been stopped by the fire blockade of enemy machine guns, anti-tank guns, tank guns and rapid fire weapons, or else they were, after the initial breakthrough, too depleted to exploit the successes or to expand.
"The support by artillery and heavy weapons could have hardly been better and the fighting skill as well as the attack morale and death braving fortitude of the Grenadiers could not have been surpassed. But the forces committed were too weak and became weaker all the time.
"Against the powerful, repelling effectiveness of the tough, stubborn, skilfully dug-in and strong defending forces, the could not make any headway.
"At Reconnaissance Battalion 26 in the area facing Isle-la-Hesse the situation remained unchanged. With an unrelenting effort, the battalion tried to get forward and had committed all its personnel into the battle.
"Rifle Regiment 39 was located outside Isle-le-Pre, a bulwark of the enemy defence. Well directed, powerful German fire was being placed on the enemy. The remnants of the rifle regiment made repeated desperate efforts to advance towards the village and tried to encircle it. But all the attack waves were shattered by the wild defensive fire (especially also from tank guns) which they encountered despite visible losses on the enemy side. Panzer Grenadier Regiment 901 reported that 'an assault group (about one company of around 20 to 30 men strong) had gotten up as far as the road fork at the southeastern entrance to Bastogne. There it had apparently been cut off and annihilated. The regiment had not had a sufficient amount of forces to reinforce this assault group. The few reinforcements had been halted by the heavy flanking fire and had, more or less, been wiped out.'
"Grenadier regiment 78, forced by enemy pressure, had to give up some of the terrain on both sides of the Bourcy - Bastogne railroad line which had been gained by the assault group, but at the time some of its assault detachments were fighting successfully southeast of Mont.
"By early afternoon on 25 December, the division command - on the basis of personal impressions and reports received - had come to the conclusion that the first large-scale attack had failed. This was due to insufficient means at the disposal of the attacker; the supply of both personnel and material had been too limited from the start, despite all the concentration and despite space restrictions in the attack area.
"The 26th Division, in committing the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, had utilized all its available resources. The division could not give more than it had at its disposal. Nothing had been sufficient.
"Whenever since the encirclement of Bastogne, it was on 25 December that the battle had hung in the balance.
"It was evident that the enemy had suffered heavily; no doubt his combat strength had been hit severely.
"Some of his tanks had been destroyed, his units had been split up, torn, smashed and he had lost weapons, equipment and prisoners. But he still had sufficient strength - regards morale, personnel and equipment - to be able , possibly in the last minute, to bring the exhausted attacking forces to a 'halt.'
"In the afternoon, the division - recognizing the situation and in order to cut down the losses - ordered the attacks to be discontinued and some of the forward combat groups to be taken back to more favorable terrain. This affected particularly Regiment 78 and remnants of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. Reconnaissance Battalion 26 and Rifle Regiment 39 stuck to their positions. The enemy reacted with very powerful and effective fire concentrations. Pursuits of the remaining German forces did not take place. Much later only some infantry forces, with tank protection, felt their way cautiously and occupied some advanced positions without opposition.
"The enemy at first continued his counterattacks against the front of Reconnaissance Battalion 26 near Isle-le-Hesse and the Isle-la-Ore area, but with the fall of dusk these attacks also ceased and there remained only the heavy, rolling concentrated fire attacks which poured onto the German positions surrounding Bastogne.
"Reports coming in from the 5th Parachute Infantry Division and the occasional orientation through higher headquarters gave no clear picture about the developments in the rear of the 26th division.
"Only one thing was certain: the 5th Parachute Infantry Division, along its entire front between the Bastogne - Neufchateau road and the highway to the south, was engaged in a defensive battle against the enemy attacking from the southwest. By afternoon, however, the troops had cleared all enemy attacks along a line extending about as follows: road fork 2 kilometres north of Nives - Remoiville - Hollange.
"The division planned for another thrust on Bastogne during the evening hours. From the salient near Isle-la-Hesse a combat group - made up of concentrated elements of Grenadier Regiment 77 and elements of Reconnaissance Battalion 26 together with about 10 tank destroyers ('Jagdpanzer') - was to stage a surprise attack to the northeast in the direction of Hemroulle, was to push through the wooded sections north of Isle-la-Hesse and then to make the drive onto Bastogne via the area south of Savy. After penetrations of the wooded section north of Isle-le-Hesse, all the forces located between Grand Fanges and the highway to the west, while screening off to the north and by-passing Hemroulle in the south, should follow through to the east (towards Bastogne) in a wedge formation. 'This was a desperate attempt to turn once more - with a final and concentrated effort - the fate of the day. It failed.
"During the assembly in the darkness, a powerful fire concentration - even for wartime conditions it was exceptionally effective - smashed the assembled troops of Grenadier regiment 78 in such a way that there remained of a single battalion, for instance, only about 30 to 40 men which, together with their battalion commander, could be committed for the attack. All others had been either killed, wounded or dispersed.
"In spite of that, however, the attack is being opened at the ordered hour - towards 2000 hours - by the tank destroyers ('Jagdpanzer') of Reconnaissance Battalion 26 with accompanying infantry, followed by small groups of Grenadier Regiment 78, under cover of a dense fire curtain by German artillery and heavy infantry weapons.
"Moving forward on both sides of the country road leading from Isle-la-Hesse to Hemroulle, they fought their way up to about 1000 meters distance of Hemroulle, at times by means of furious close combat. There - after again having had to overcome fanatical enemy resistance - they came across an anti-tank switch line which proved an unpassable obstacle to the 'Jadgpanzer' (pursuit tanks) which, in the darkness, were functioning poorly anyhow.
"More than half of the tank destroyers were destroyed or put out of action from a very close distance (including also the company commander with his car).
"Under heavy enemy fire - covered by a smokescreen - the remaining fragments of the last combat group made a withdrawal to their original positions.
'During that and the following night, all the incapacitated pursuit tanks with the exception of two, were towed back into our lines with prime movers and under the protection of volunteer security troops. Despite several attempts it was impossible to reach the car of the company commander.
"In the late evening, the division reported to the corps that, after exhaustion of all possibilities and despite the splendid fortitude and fighting spirits of all attacking units and their leaders, the large-scale offensive had failed; to continue the attacks on Bastogne with the now decimated division would be irresponsible and unfeasible. The remaining forces of the division were weakened to such and extent that it was questionable whether they would be able to withstand at all an energetic thrust by the enemy.
"The corps took cognizance of this report, abstained from further attacks for the moment and ordered the positions to be held.
"It was 'hoped' that the division would hold out long enough for the 'Fuehrer Begleit Brigade' (Fuehrer Escort Brigade) a combat unit which, although only recently activated, was particularly well equipped - to arrive in the combat area. This unit was expected to arrive in the evening of 26 December or during 27 December.
"Even though the overall situation both at Sixth SS Panzer Army and the Fifth Panzer Army at that time left no doubt that the Ardennes offensive had been a failure, the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht did not draw and radical conclusions and decisions.
"Corps orders to the division for 26 December were to keep up, while holding on to the terrain gained, the encirclement of Bastogne and to prevent any possible breakouts on the part of the forces occupying Bastogne or their attempts to join up with the forces pushing up from the south."
"This order was passed on by the division to its regiments. To create - so far as possible - some protection against the suspected attack from the south and southwest, Panzer Grenadier Regiment 901 and Rifle Regiment 39 were ordered to strengthen their positions on both sides of the north-south highway and on both sides of the Neufchateau road and railroad line as much as possible. To accomplish this the sector of Regiment 901 was reduced when some of its elements were relieved through Grenadier Regiment 78 which expanded to the south via the Bastogne - Bras road as far as Marvie (exclusive). The only possible source of reinforcements for Rifle Regiment 39 were the security guards, which were brought up from their previous locations in the Hubermont and Brut - Lavasselle areas."
"As its defensive responsibility, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was assigned the sector extending from the highway to the west (inclusive) to the wooded sections 800 meters west of Grandes Fanges.
"Adjoining to the right as far as the Bastogne - Senonchamps road was Reconnaissance Battaion 26; to the left, immediately west of Grandes Fanges as far as Longchamps was Grenaduer Regiment 77."
"Despite commitment of all means, despite exploitation of all possibilities and despite an incomparable spirit of sacrifice of all units committed for attack and battle, the day had not brought the success aimed for.
"The accomplishments of both the troops and leaders can only be valued by those who have actually lived through the battle. It would be a deliberate, malicious distortion of the truth, should anyone blame the attitude of the troops for the failure!
"It was the insufficient ratio of strength of those units which had been committed by higher headquarters, it was the non-arrival of the promised air support, it was an estimate of the enemy which ignored the actual facts; all these factors had a decisive effect on the day's happenings and they could neither be balanced nor replaced by combat skill, toughness and spirit of sacrifice on the part of the troops."
"The day had brought very high losses."
"The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was practically wiped out; the 26th Division counted more than 800 killed, wounded and missing. Grenadier Regiment 77 had barely 300 men left in the front; one battalion had about 80 men, the other possibly 200 men. Reconnaissance Battalion 26, the same as Rifle Regiment 39, had been reduced to a fragment of its original strength. The companies in the front had, at best, 20 to 25 men left. Supply formations, staffs and other rear echelon units were thoroughly combed out. The Replacement Training Battalion - having transferred in the meantime some formations to Panzer Grenadier Regiment 901 as well as Rifle Regiment 39 and Grenadier Regiment 77 - had about 200 men left.
The losses of old, experienced subordinate commanders and men, the high losses of officers and trained specialists at the artillery and heavy infantry weapons, were of great importance.
"A considerable amount of heavy weapons equipment had been destroyed by enemy fire and could not be replaced immediately.
"Due to lack of ammunition, some of the heavy mortars had been withdrawn from the front and assembled in a division depot. The crews, same as the 14th (tank destroyer) companies, had become assigned to the firing line as assault troops.
"On 25 December, the division had been reduced to its last fragments.
"Certainly the enemy was severely hit by his losses as well. In addition to considerable losses of weapons and prisoners, the concentrated German fire and the bitterly conducted assault and hand-to-hand battles must have caused him heavy losses. As was proven by his attitude when we abandoned some of our positions, he also was exhausted and at the end of his strength.
"It ought to be emphasized , however, at this point: The attacking German forces had for a long time been certain that they were facing a picked unit of the American Army. The fighting on 25 December had only served to underline this conclusion.
"Defender and attacker were imbued with the same fighting morale, the same combat fitness, toughness and determination.
"Friend and foe fought through this day as equivalent opponents." (Jay Stone)
US fighter ace George Preddy is killed when his P-51 is shot down by friendly fire. He was credited with 27 kills.
George Preddy's Mustangs had the mission of wiping out any German fighters who were able to penetrate to the battle zone. Ground control vectored the P-51s to the hot spots. Presently, the 328th Squadron received orders to intercept a group of bandits spotted near Koblenz, Germany that were on their way to intercept U.S. bombers. Preddy's Mustangs arrived in the vicinity at 24,000 feet and soon spotted the enemy in two gaggles. Capt. Bill Stangel dove on one of the groups and quickly shot down two Me 109s. Blue Flight was frustrated to lose the enemy in the clouds near Koblenz, although they did fight four Fw 190s near Maastricht no the way back to Asch. Capt. Charles Cesky quickly shot down three of the aircraft with his wingman, Lt. Al Cheeser, knocking out the fourth. Preddy's group also did well; the commander destroyed his 26th and 27th German planes over Koblenz. Lt. James Lambright and Ray Mitchell, also managed to shoot down others of thir won. With these victories, the daily total claims of the 328th Fighter Squadron stood at eleven German aircraft.
However, after these victories, Preddy's White Flight was sent to Liege, Belgium where they were to bounce some low flying German aircraft reported in the area. Flying along with Preddy, was Lt. James T. Cartee, his wingman, and Lt. Bouchier, who had joined up after having gotten separated from the 479th FG. As the three Mustangs flew over the dense forests at the northeastern reaches of the Ardennes, Preddy spotted a Fw190 flying at very low level. He gave chase at treetop level. Flying after the plane at low altitude, Bouchier saw Preddy's Mustang suddenly pull up trailing an ugly plume of coolant. Bouchier realized that they were under anti-aircraft fire when his craft shuddered from the blast of a 40mm shell. Damn! Jst then he saw the lead Mustang crash into a field, but there was little time to look. He was in big trouble, his cockpit quickly filling with smoke. Although only 1,000 feet in the air over the hilly Hurtgen Forest, Bouchier thought fast and flipped his P-51 over. Shedding the plexiglass canopy, he dropped out of his stricken machine. His parachute blossomed with a sudde jolt5, barely having time to break his fall. He landed very hard on the frozen ground, rising to release his chute and lucky to be in one piece. Above, Lt. Cartee was also hit by the ground fire, but managed to get away in one piece.
"As went over the woods, I was hit by ground fire. Maj. Preddy apparently noticed the intense ground fire and light flak and broke off the attack with a chandelle to the left. About halfway through the maneuver and about 700 feet altitude his canopy came off and he nosed down, still in his turn. I saw no chute and watched his ship hit."
GERMANY: U-2520 is commissioned
GREECE: Churchill and Eden arrive in for talks with Greek Leaders. The British are very much in control and the fighting wanes.
COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES: The cream of the Japanese troops on Luzon are transferred to Cebu and Mindanao, after Yamashita says that he can no longer guarantee getting supplied through to them.
Palompan, Leyte, is occupied.
MARIANAS ISLANDS, SAIPAN: In a combined high-low attack Japanese intruders destroy one B-29, damage three beyond repair and inflict minor damage on eleven.
ATLANTIC OCEAN:
Frigate
HMS Dakins is mined in the English Channel 14 miles NW of Ostend at 51 25N 02
44E.Although a lot of water was taken into the forward compartment, good damage
control enables her to return to the UK under her own power. However, she is not
considered worth repairing.
Frigate
HMS Capel is torpedoed and sunk by U-486 (Oberleutnant der
Reserve Gerhard Meyer) at 1237. The torpedo explosion blew the bridge structure
aft until it rested on her funnel. Capel sank very slowly and capsized at 1602.
There are 7 casualties. Location: 49 48N 01 43W.
Whilst
searching for Capel’s assailant, frigate HMS Affleck takes a hit from a Zaunkönig
fired by U-486. The explosion blew
off 60 feet of AFFLECKs stern but she reaches Cherbourg under her own power and
is later towed to Portsmouth, but never repaired. Location: 49 48N 01 41W. (Alex
Gordon)(108)