By Jack McKillop
THE ATTACK ON USAAF INSTALLATIONS
"All the publicity is 'Remember Pearl Harbor.' They should take a look at Hickam Field or what was Hickam Field. Twenty seven bombs hit the main barracks. They dropped about 100 bombs on Hickam, practically all hits. The papers say they are poor bombardiers! They were perfect on nearly all their releases."
- Charles P. Eckhert, Major, Army Air Forces, 10 December 1941.
At approximately 0755 hours on 7 December 1941 the first Japanese aircraft struck the Territory of Hawaii. In less than two hours they inflicted upon the Hawaiian Air Force the most terrible destruction it had ever received. All the anti-saboteur alerts, mock battles, and practice deployments proved to be of no avail during the actual attack. Only the individual courage and sacrifice of personnel acting in fear and desperation prevented the Japanese from completely destroying the Army Air Forces on Oahu.
THE JAPANESE ATTACK
The Japanese planned to hit Pearl Harbor just after sunrise on a Sunday morning. They reasoned, correctly, that defenses would be at their weakest at this time due to the American tradition of taking Sunday as a rest day. The attack's primary purpose was to inflict sufficient damage on the US Fleet so it would be unable to interfere with their conquest plans in the Pacific for at least six months. Six carriers - HIJMS Akagi, HIJMS Kaga, HIJMS Soryu, HIJMS Hiryu, HIJMS Shokaku, and HIJMS Zuikaku - would transport a 360- aircraft attack force to a point 220 miles (354
kilometres) north of Oahu. The Japanese believed their carriers, concealed by darkness during the final approach, could steam no closer without risk of being spotted by American reconnaissance aircraft. So worried were they about the air defenses on Oahu, they committed over a third of the attacking aircraft just to provide air cover for the remaining force. Another 39 aircraft would take off and fly top cover for the carrier force, just in case the Americans tried to attack.
Three types of aircraft were used in the attack: 143 Nakajima B5N2, Navy Type 97 Carrier Attack Bomber Model 12 three-place bombers (later assigned Allied Code Name "Kate"), 129 Aichi D3A1, Navy Type 99 Carrier Bomber Model 11 two -place dive bombers (later assigned Allied Code Name "Val"), and 78 Mitsubishi A6M2, Navy Type 0 Carrier Fighters Model 21 (later assigned Allied Code Name "Zeke"). The Nakajima "Kate" was used with three different bomb loads. Forty aircraft were loaded with 800-kilogram (1,764-pound) modified torpedos for use against large naval targets. Another 49 Nakajimas were loaded with 800-kilogram (1,764-pound) specially modified, armor-piercing 16-inch (40.64 centimeter) naval shells, also for use against large ships. The remaining 54 aircraft carried a mixed load; 18 had two 250-kilogram (551-pound) bombs for land targets, and 36 had one 250-kilogram (551-pound) and six 60- kilogram (132-pound) bombs, also for land targets. In addition each aircraft carried a hand-operated, rear-mounted, 7.7 mm (303-calibre) machine gun. The Nakajima delivered its bomb load primarily from the horizontal position, either at high altitude (around 10,000 feet or 3,048 meters) for those carrying the modified artillery shells or at low altitude (50 feet or 15.2 meters) for those with torpedoes. Bombers with multiple bomb loads could drop them either singly, in pairs, or all at once depending on the targets attacked.
The Aichi "Vals" carried a 250-kilogram (551-pound) land target bomb during the first attack and a 250-kilogram (551-pound) ordinary bomb for use against naval targets during the second attack. In addition, each aircraft could carry two 60- kilogram (132-pound) bombs under the wings. According to eyewitness accounts several dive bombers made multiple bombing runs, and these may have had the additional 60-kilogram (132-pound) bombs on board, although no Japanese records have been found supporting this claim. Each aircraft had two fuselage-mounted, forward- firing, 7.7 mm (303-calibre) machine guns and a hand-operated, rear-mounted, 7.7 mm (303-calibre) machine gun. After completing its bombing attack, the aircraft could make repeated strafing attacks.
The Mitsubishi "Zeke" fighters were the Japanese Navy's best aircraft. On the morning of 7 December they could outmaneuver anything stationed on Oahu. Armed with two wing-mounted 20mm cannons and two 7.7 mm (303-calibre) machine guns mounted in the engine cowling, they also outgunned anything that would be sent up against them. Their primary job was to protect the other aircraft against American fighters. After gaining air superiority, or in case there was little to no fighter resistance, the "Zeke" pilots were free to attack targets of opportunity anywhere on the island.
Ideally, all the aircraft would strike their assigned targets simultaneously, thus assuring complete surprise. To launch and assemble that many aircraft in the dark would be difficult and would consume large quantities of fuel needed for the actual attack. The Japanese then modified the plan. Half the force, or 189 aircraft, would attack in the first wave and the remaining 171 would hit 30 minutes later. Thirty-nine fighters would take off and remain above the carriers to provide protection in case of attack. All the torpedo bombers were in the first wave because they were the most vulnerable and needed the surprise element to insure success. The launch was accomplished almost exactly according to plan. All the first wave aircraft except one horizontal bomber, three dive bombers, and two "Zeke" fighters launched within 15-minutes, a record for the Japanese. All the aborts from the first wave were for mechanical problems that developed prior to takeoff. The second wave, although delayed due to rough seas, made it off with the loss of only four aircraft. Two dive bombers aborted on takeoff, while one dive bomber and one "Zeke" aborted for mechanical problems.
Roughly 20-minutes ahead of this attacking armada flew two Aichi E13A1, Navy Type 0 Reconnaissance Seaplane Model 11 scout planes (later assigned the Allied Code Name "Jake") launched from the heavy cruisers HIJMS Chikuma and HIJMS Tone. It was their job to make last-minute observations of Pearl Harbor and the alternate fleet staging area at Lahaina on Maui, and notify Lieutenant Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, airborne commander, of any changes. This meant breaking radio silence, but Fuchida considered this information so critical he was willing to take the chance that the Americans would not discover the scout aircraft. Not only were the scout planes spotted, five different radar stations on Oahu tracked one of them across the island. Unfortunately , these stations had no idea how important this contact was and did nothing about it. The scout planes encountered no opposition and radioed back that the weather over the target was clear, no ships were anchored at Lahaina, and no changes in the ships at Pearl Harbor had been made.
Just north of Kahuku Point the first wave formed into attack formations, turned west, and paralleled the island for several miles. On reaching the Haleiwa area, the force split into two groups. Fuchida took direct command of the horizontal bombers and the torpedo planes under the command of Lieutenant Commander Shigeharu Murata and headed toward Kaena Point. Just short of the Point, Fuchida again changed direction, heading south, staying west of the Waianae Mountains. These two groups of aircraft split again before the actual attack on Pearl Harbor; so they hit the facility from the west and south. Other than uncoordinated strafing passes on Hickam Field and other targets of opportunity, none of these aircraft directly attacked the Hawaiian Air Force facilities on Oahu; their targets were the Navy ships in the harbor.
Lieutenant Commander Shigeru Itaya's fighters escorted various units including the dive bomber force under Lieutenant Commander Kakuichi Takahashi. After separating from Fuchida, Takahashi's bombers flew straight down the center of Oahu, with the fighters providing top cover. Their route took them over Wheeler Field, where they divided and part of the force attacked the field from the east and west, while the rest continued on down the island to Hickam Field and NAS Pearl Harbor on Ford Island, where they again divided and attacked from several directions. From there they moved on to Pearl Harbor, Ford Island, and finally MCAS Ewa.
The first Hawaiian Air Force installation to be hit by this attacking force was Wheeler Field. Approaching the field from the north, the dive bombers split into two groups. Takahashi took 26 aircraft and continued south to hit Hickam Field and Ford Island, while Lieutenant Akira Sakamoto took the remaining 25 into Wheeler. Part of Sakamoto's force turned west and then south, paralleling the Waianae Mountains until abreast of the base, then headed east and began diving on the base from the west. The rest of his aircraft turned east, then south, then west, and hit the field from the east. No one on the ground sighted these aircraft until they had made the final turn for the attack. Eyewitness accounts would claim the aircraft coming in from the west had flown through a pass in the Waianaes called Kolekole. To someone standing on the ground, they would indeed have appeared to approach through the mountains, but all the aircraft that hit Wheeler Field came from the north and stayed east of the Waianaes.
The Japanese took Wheeler Field completely by surprise. The first wave of dive bombers lined up on the hangars paralleling the aircraft parking area. Releasing their bombs from 500 to 1000 feet (152 to 305 meters), they scored direct hits on Hangars 1 and 3 and additional buildings in that area. One bomb struck the 6th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) barracks, destroying it. After completing their bomb runs, the pilots began making strafing passes on the parked aircraft. Once Itaya realized that they had taken the Americans completely by surprise and there would be no fighter opposition, he released the fighters from their role of protector and they began strafing ground targets. The 20 mm cannons of the "Zeke" fighters would do considerable damage to ground targets. To increase the amount of damage caused during the strafing runs, the Japanese had loaded their machine gun ammunition in the following order: two armor-piercing, one tracer; two armor-piercing, one tracer; two armor-piercing, one incendiary. With this loading the bullets would puncture things like gasoline tanks, and then the tracer and incendiary rounds would explode or set them on fire. They started many fires in this manner, and a thick pall of black smoke quickly covered the area. From the air it appeared that they had severely damaged the base and had destroyed all the aircraft on the ground.
Aircraft and maintenance facilities at Wheeler Field were the primary targets of the attack. The pilots had been too well trained to waste their bombs and ammunition on insignificant targets. One bomb did land in the front yard of a house, but it probably resulted from a miss rather than a deliberate attack on the housing area. At times there were over 30 fighters and dive bombers attacking Wheeler Field from every direction. In the confusion a missed target or a long strafing run was to be expected. Schofield Barracks, located next to Wheeler Field, also appeared to be under attack with all the aircraft flying in the area; however, other than a possible isolated individual strafing attack or two, on targets of opportunity, the Japanese did not specifically target Schofield.
After making several strafing attacks on Wheeler, Lieutenant Akira Sakamoto led the dive bombers south to Marine Corps Air Station Ewa. The fighters continued a little longer and then left for other targets. While they were attacking Wheeler Field, the remaining dive bombers and fighters of the first wave continued south, where they again split and headed for either NAS Kaneohe Bay or the Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor areas. During the attack on NAS Kaneohe Bay, Lieutenant Tadashi Kaneko flew off and made a single strafing pass over Bellows Field then rejoined his unit. Why he made this lone strafing attack is not known, because Bellows Field was not on the initial target list for his group.
The dive bombers and fighters that struck Hickam Field were not the first indication that personnel there had of the attack. When some of Murata's torpedo bombers hit Pearl Harbor, they flew directly over Hickam Field on their way out from the targets. Before anyone had a chance to react to the noise coming from Pearl Harbor or identify the low flying aircraft, the dive bombers and fighters were upon them. As at Wheeler Field, the first targets were those in and around the hangar area. The attack then widened to include supply buildings, the consolidated barracks and dining hall, the base chapel, the enlisted men's beer garden, and the guardhouse all in just the first few minutes. This was in addition to machine gun attacks by both the dive bombers and the fighters on all visible aircraft and personnel in the area. Within minutes tbe base was ablaze with many fires, and the Americans lost any chance of launching aircraft to attack or quickly locate the attacking carriers.
Approximately 30 minutes later the second wave of 35 fighters, 54 horizontal bombers, and 78 dive bombers sighted the coast of Oahu. This group also approached from the north but was several miles east of the first attack. Roughly ten miles east of Kahuku Point, the second wave split into various attack groups. The dive bombers, under tbe command of Lieutenant Commander Takashige Egusa, banked slightly to the right and approached Oahu just to the west of Kaneohe Bay, heading directly for Ford Island. Later, this group, after completing their bombing runs over Ford Island and the Pearl Harbor area, made strafing runs on Hickam Field and the MCAS Ewa.
Lieutenant Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki's horizontal bombers split into three groups, with 18 aircraft coming straight in to hit NAS Kaneohe Bay. The other two groups continued flying south, passing Diamond Head to the east and circling out over the ocean, where 27 struck Hickam Field and the remaining nine hit Ford Island. Several individuals on the ground spotted this group approaching Hickam from the south, reinforcing rumors that the enemy carriers lay to the south of the island. Dividing again into two groups, the horizontal bombers hit Hickam from both low level, around 150 feet (46 meters), and high level, about 1,000 feet (305 meters). Targets of this attack continued to be buildings close to the flight line, the consolidated barracks, and the baseball diamond located next to the fire department facility.
Staying with the horizontal and dive bombers, the fighters under Lieutenant Saburo Shindo struck NAS Kaneohe Bay, Hickam Field, and NAS Pearl Harbor. Seeing no resistance, Lieutenant Sumio Nono led nine fighters away from NAS Kaneohe Bay toward Bellows Field. Attacking from the ocean side of the base, the fighters made repeated strafing attacks, destroying or damaging most of the aircraft parked there, the tent city area, and hitting several buildings. After completing their attack on Bellows, the fighters returned to NAS Kaneohe Bay and from there, worked their way back to their carriers.
In less than an hour the Japanese had destroyed or damaged more than 50-percent of the Hawaiian Air Force's aircraft, many buildings and support facilities, and left over 600 casualties on the three main airfields. The only people who saw the attack coming were the radar operators, and even they were not exactly sure what they were looking at.
HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE OPPOSITION
The Japanese caught the Hawaiian Air Force completely by surprise. There was no coordinated, systematic, island-wide air defence that morning. Instead, fourteen individual pilots attempted to engage the enemy with varying degrees of success. Later in the morning, after the attacks, another dozen pilots took off not knowing the Japanese had left the area. Those involved in the attack considered it quite an accomplishment just to get a fighter in the air that morning, much less to do any damage to the attackers.
The first confirmed takeoffs by American pilots against the attack occurred at Haleiwa Auxiliary Field. [The 47th Pursuit Squadron (Fighter) had deployed to Haleiwa for gunnery training. Because aircraft may have been flown back and forth between Haleiwa and Wheeler Field over the weekend, the exact number and type of aircraft physically located at Haleiwa cannt be determined.] Second Lieutenants George S. Welch and Kenneth M. Taylor traveled by automobile from Wheeler Field to Haleiwa when they realized the island was under attack. Their squadron had deployed to Haleiwa for gunnery practice, and the Japanese had not attacked there. Ground crews got the Curtiss P-40s armed and ready to go when Welch and Taylor arrived so they could immediately take off. The time was around 0830 hours. Ground control directed the two pilots to head for the southern tip of the island where the Japanese from the first wave were still strafing the Marine base at Ewa. Spotting a group of enemy planes in a long line, both pilots jumped into the line and began shooting down aircraft, each getting two confirmed kills during this first engagement. Taylor fired on a third plane but did not see the crash. Both pilots were running out of ammunition and low on fuel, so they returned to Wheeler Field to rearm and refuel.
At Wheeler Field, things were in turmoil. The Japanese attack had destroyed or damaged most of the P-40s. One hangar had received a direct hit and secondary explosions from the ammunition stored in it continued for several hours. As ground personnel reached the flight line, they began pulling the aircraft away from the immediate area into the protective revetments around the field. Once the aircraft were clear, they returned to the hangar area to gather up as much ammunition as they could find and returned to the aircraft to arm and prepare them for flight. By this time there were many more pilots available than aircraft ready to fly, so it became a contest as to who would get which aircraft. First Lieutenant Lewis M. Sanders picked three experienced pilots and told them to grab the first available aircraft and follow him for a four-ship attack. Lieutenants John M. Thacker and Philip M. Rasmussen stayed by their aircraft until they were ready to go and then jumped in and began to taxi. Lieutenant Othneil Norris assisted in getting an aircraft ready, but left it to go get a new parachute; Second Lieutenant Gordon H. Sterling, Jr. spotted the unattended aircraft, jumped in, and taxied out to join Sanders and the other two pilots. This practice of grabbing any aircraft ready to fly would happen several more times before the day was over.
Once airborne, around 0850 hours, Sanders led the flight east toward Bellows Field. Spotting the Japanese second wave over NAS Kaneohe Bay, the four Curtiss P-36A Hawks immediately engaged. Sanders got on the tail of an enemy aircraft and shot it down. Coming off the attack, he spotted Sterling in hot pursuit of a Japanese plane that was diving toward the water. Behind Sterling another Japanese had gotten into the fight and was shooting at Sterling. Sanders came up behind this aircraft and opened fire. Rasmussen observed the four aircraft: the plane that Sterling was attacking crashed; Sterling, close behind, also plunged into the sea, shot down by the Japanese on his tail; Sanders meanwhile had set fire to this fighter, but Rasmussen did not know whether it, too, went into the water. Just before witnessing Sterling's death, Rasmussen had charged his guns, only to have them start firing on their own. While trying to stop the guns from firing, a Japanese aircraft passed directly in front of him and exploded. Things began to happen fast after that, and he soon had two "Zeke" fighters on his tail. Taking evasive action, he lost them in some cloud cover. Meanwhile, Thacker dove into the battle, only to discover his guns had jammed and would not fire. He kept making passes at the Japanese until hit several times, then broke off the engagement and returned to base. Sanders found himself alone with a "Zeke" and was quickly losing the flying contest. Deciding that discretion was the better part of valor, he broke off the one-sided contest and headed back to Wheeler Field. So far the Americans had managed to get six aircraft airborne and had shot down seven Japanese with two more probables at the cost of one P-36.
From that point on, the story became confusing; and, because pilots were taking off individually from two different fields and then joining up after getting airborne, takeoff times were difficult, if not impossible, to verify. About the same time Sanders' flight was mixing it up with the Japanese over NAS Kaneohe Bay, Welch and Taylor were ready to head out on their second flight that morning. Welch got off first, and just as Taylor was ready to go, another Japanese attack hit Wheeler Field. Taylor waited until what he thought was the last in the line of Japanese aircraft and took off after them, guns blazing. Just after he became airborne, another Japanese got on his tail and opened fire. For a few seconds it looked grim but Welch had stayed in the immediate area, saw what was happening to Taylor, and came to the rescue. He jumped behind the aircraft that was shooting at Taylor and scored his third kill for the day. This allowed Taylor to break free and gain altitude. Although wounded in the action Taylor was still able to fly, so he continued attacking Japanese aircraft wherever he could find them, damaging at least one more. Welch, meanwhile, headed back to MCAS Ewa and got a confirmed kill on another J apanese, bringing his total for the day to four.
Meanwhile, at Bellows Field, First Lieutenant Samuel W. Bishop and Second Lieutenant George A. Whiteman attempted to take off to join the defence. (Beginning on 7 November 1941, personnel and P-40s of the 44th Pursuit Squadron began deploying to Bellows Field for a month's aerial gunnery training. This involved the squadron's twelve P-40s and a complement of crew chiefs, assistants, armorers, radio men and other support
troops.) Whiteman was hit as he cleared the ground and crashed just off
the end of the runway. Bishop managed to get his P-40 into the air; but before he could gain altitude, several "Zeke" fighters attacked him, and he crashed into the ocean. Whiteman was killed instantly, but Bishop was only wounded and managed to swim to shore. While this was going on, Haleiwa launched aircraft as fast as pilots showed up. Lieutenants John Dains and John Webster both got off at different times in P-40s, while Lieutenants Harry Brown and Robert Rogers each took off in P-36As. From Wheeler Field, Lieutenants Malcolm Moore and Othneil Norris entered the fight, also flying P-36As. Brown and Rogers headed out to Kahuku Point, where they engaged the enemy without any confirmed kills, but Rogers damaged one enemy aircraft.
From there they joined up with Moore and Webster and headed west. At Kaena Point, Webster damaged one aircraft, but could not confirm a kill. Rogers was cornered by two Japanese; and Brown plowed into the fight, shooting down one attacker. As the action started to wind down, Moore opened up on one retreating Japanese aircraft but failed to down it. Brown spotted the smoking ship and also fired but, like Moore, could not hit a vital spot, and the aircraft got away. Rogers started to run low on fuel, so he returned to Haleiwa where he took off on his second mission in a P-36A. Dains also returned to Haleiwa and got off on a second mission in a P- 40.
By this time the Japanese had completed their attack and were returning to their carriers as fast as they could. Wheeler Field and Haleiwa kept launching aircraft for the next hour with little coordination or direction for the pilots. No additional combat with the Japanese occurred. One mystery still remains concerning the action that occurred in the air that Sunday morning. Radar operators at the station at Kaaawa watched a P-40 shoot down a Japanese "Zeke" during the height of the battle. The operators were positive the American aircraft was a P-40, and they identified it both from its distinctive silhouette and the sound of its engine. None of the pilots that survived that morning's action remembered flying in the Kaawa area. The only pilot whose action was unaccounted for was Lieutenant John Dains, who flew two missions that morning in a P-40. Both times he was separated from the other American fighters and fought by himself. After landing the second time, he switched to a P-36A and joined up with George Welch for a third mission. Neither pilot spotted anything because by that time the Japanese had cleared the area, so they decided to return to Wheeler Field. On the return flight, antiaircraft guns at Schofield Barracks opened up on the two aircraft, killing Dains. There were three plausible explanations. First, the radar operators could have been mistaken in what they saw; second, some other P-40 pilot downed the Japanese plane and was unaware where the action occurred; or third, we suspect that Dains did get the enemy plane as the ground personnel observed and just never got the chance to tell his story.
The Japanese would concede the loss of 29 aircraft from all causes that morning. The Hawaiian Air Force claimed ten of those losses with four more probables and two Japanese aircraft damaged. If Dains' kill is added to the list, the score comes out to eleven Japanese aircraft destroyed in air-to-air combat with a loss of four American planes, which were flown by Whiteman, Sterling, Bishop, and Dains. Sterling was the only pilot lost in actual combat with the enemy; the Japanese downed Whiteman and Bishop during takeoff, and friendly fire shot down Dains. Could the American fighter forces have made a difference that morning had they known about the attack? The above information would certainly seem to suggest they could. But it is important to remember that the Japanese had committed over half their force just to deal with the American fighters. They abandoned their whole fighter defence system when they encountered no initial reaction from the Americans. This meant that the few aircraft that did get airborne that morning hit an almost unprotected attacking force. Welch and Taylor's encounters over MCAS Ewa during their first flight provided an example of this. Had the American forces met the Japanese from the beginning, the formation over Ewa would certainly have had "Zeke" fighters flying top cover for them. As Sanders discovered over Kaneohe, the P-36A was no match for the "Zeke"; and without special training or good luck, neither was the P-40B and C. But these are matters of speculation. More important under the circumstances that morning, however, was how the personnel of the Hawaiian Air Force in fact responded. From the lowest ranking ground personnel to the hottest fighter pilot in the command, everyone did the best they could with what they had. The men of the Hawaiian Air Force might have been caught by surprise, but they most certainly did not give up.